During the 50th anniversary of Indian independence two summers ago, British newspapers ran frequent features on the growing profile of Asian culture in Britain. Demonstrating an impressive capacity for spin control, music pundits reworked the moral panic generated around Asian culture during the Rushdie affair in order to celebrate “the Asian invasion of club culture.” The echo of anti-immigrant rhetoric within such media hype may be unsettling, but it should not lead us to ignore a genuinely significant shift in representations of youth culture. For the first time, British culture was being described in terms which challenged the black/white binary that has governed postwar representations of racial difference. Two years later, the wealth of music emanating from Britain’s South Asian club scene has consolidated the central position of Asian producers in British youth culture, despite the popularity of some such producers’ self-description as the “Asian underground.” DJs and groups such as Asian Dub Foundation, Badmarsh, Black Star Liner, Cornershop, Earthtribe, Fun^Da^Mental, DJ Ritu, Nitin Sahnwey, Talvin Singh, and State of Bengal have become crucial producers not just of dance music but of contemporary British identity.

This extraordinary creative upsurge extends the shift begun by the re-invention of bhangra music in the early 1980s. Bhangra - originally an acoustic form of folk music connected with harvest celebrations in India’s Punjab - was transformed by musicians who immigrated to Britain to fill a labor shortage during the post-war economic boom. Adapting amplified instruments, drum machines, and synthesizers to the bhangra tradition’s rolling rhythms, these
musicians created a peculiarly British form that has become a potent signifier of identity within the global Asian diaspora. In films such as “I’m British But...” and “Bhaji on the Beach,” South Asian director Gurinder Chadha has explored bhangra’s central role as a cultural form giving expression to and carving out space for a newly confident generation of British-born Asian youth in the mid-’80s. Today, a new generation of British-born South Asian youths is appropriating an even wider variety of subcontinental musical forms, from the evolving sounds of Hindi film soundtracks to folk and classical music from all over South Asia, in an extension of the tradition that gave birth to British bhangra. Using the recombinatory potential of digital sampling, this second generation is mixing South Asian music with electronic rhythms like drum ‘n’ bass, jungle, techno, hip-hop and dub to create a compelling new syncretic sound.

Have such vibrant performances of diasporic expression and affiliation undermined the hegemonic claims of the nation-state? Do the multiple border crossings associated with this omnivorously appropriative style announce the birth of a new globalized sphere of consumer identity? This has certainly been the claim in many recent discussions of transnational cultures like those of Britain’s Asian Underground. The increasing visibility of a dramatically global sphere of communications, along with the transnational economic circuits that support this new sphere, is frequently cited by contemporary analysts as evidence for the terminal decline of the institutions and identifications that define national identities. As Frederick Buell has recently commented, such analysis gyrates between opposed poles, seeing globalization as including, on the one hand, the integration of every corner of the globe into a transnational web of economic circuits and, on the other hand, the proliferation of anti-hierarchical, polyglossic communication flows. The East Asian crash has certainly muted some of the neo-liberal triumphalism which followed the end of the Cold War and which, I suspect, may explain the totalizing tenor that
characterizes many recent discussions of globalization. As fresh crises force both policymakers and average citizens to grapple with the contradictions inherent in global capitalism, the necessity of tracking the movements of culture and capital in and out of particular localities will doubtless become ever more apparent.

The instabilities of global capitalism are likely, in other words, to spur more close attention to the interconnections between different spatial frames, from the local to the global. Drawing on the work of contemporary geographers such as Doreen Massey and Neil Smith as well as the growing body of ethnographic work on the media, I argue below that the global economy has indeed rendered the multiplicity of circuits which traverse particular social spaces more visible. This is the meaning of the changes in production and consumption that Stuart Hall has characterized as “new times.” Yet the multiple facets of specific spaces are constantly subject to hegemonic projects which attempt to impose particular sets of coordinates, economic constraints, and significations as primary. It is my contention that such struggles for hegemony still take place primarily within the sphere of the nation.

Indeed, as Saskia Sassen has forcefully argued, the nation-state remains the crucial nexus through which globalizing cultural and economic forces must pass. Much of the recent theoretical work on globalization elides the crucial role played by particular nation-states in advancing or contesting the aims of contemporary capitalism. In addition, while there have been some forceful critiques of discourses of globalization and hybridity recently, few of these analyses have theorized the relation between the nation and what has been called glocalization in detail. There are, as a result, still many questions concerning the way in which globalization, while significantly extending transnational exchanges, has been dependent on the facilitating regulatory structure of the nation-state as it makes such transformations. In order to find sites of
intervention in the global cultural economy, we need to consider the complex interaction between the apparently global forces of this economy and the specific forms of state regulation that facilitate their articulation on particular local terrain.

This approach has the additional benefit of shedding light on the continuing resonance of nationalism in contemporary politics and popular discourse. Far from being atomized, nationalist rhetoric seems to have proliferated within both official as well as popular culture. In the following discussion I will focus on a case study that highlights these issues as they play out in the dramatic new visibility of Asian music producers in Britain. Britain is a particularly interesting site to examine in the context of debates about nationalism and globalization since it is characterized both by a continuing firm adherence to the neo-liberal economic doctrines popularized by Margaret Thatcher as well as by strains of popular racism that continually reinvoke the nation’s history of empire. This history not only bequeathed a particularly xenophobic form of nationalism, it also cemented the connection between members of the postcolonial diaspora in Britain and powerful traditions of anti-colonial nationalism. It is this legacy of racism and anti-racism that I explore below through a discussion of the black power-inflected hip hop music of Asian Dub Foundation. ADF’s militant dub tracks offer a compelling example of the complex syncretic vibe evolving in contemporary youth cultures, subcultures that are global in their appropriative reach.

Yet it is only through a nuanced understanding of the particular racial formations and conflicts that developed in London’s East End during the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, I argue, that we can make sense of the musical form and nationalist rhetoric found in ADF’s powerful work. It is to this context in the East End, and in particular to the battles over the meaning and form of re-development that took place in the Docklands, that I turn first. Having examined the struggles
over space and community that took place in the East End, I move to a discussion of ADF’s anti-racist dub music. By rejecting the facile opposition of diaspora and nation, ADF’s work offers significant insights into the struggles over space and identity that increasingly shape popular culture. Rather than seeing diasporic identity as an alternative to Britishness, ADF use their connections with multiple sites outside the nation to issue a strident challenge to the shallow multiculturalism that characterizes Tony Blair’s “cool Britannia.” Perhaps most significantly, ADF also invoke traditions of anti-colonial nationalism in order to criticize the forms of spatial, cultural, and economic apartheid that remain a constitutive feature of British society. A discussion of ADF’s work, then, forces us to reconsider the increasing disparities of power which frame the global cultural economy.

Globalization and the Dual City

In the years since the Thatcher revolution, Britain has followed the lead of the United States in curtailing the redistributive role of the state. While Britain retains central aspects of social democracy such as a national health service, the nation’s lack of a written constitution has given successive Tory governments lease to eradicate left-leaning local government bodies such as the Greater London Council and to centralize state power in an unprecedented manner. As Stuart Hall has convincingly argued, this dismantling of the infrastructure of the postwar social consensus is crucially connected to the restructuring of national and global economies that has been under way for the last thirty years or so. Mass production has begun to be replaced by “flexible specialization,” niche marketing and an increasingly polarized caste division in labor between highly-skilled technicians and an unskilled service sector.
While these new times have been felt throughout Britain, their impact was most dramatically evident in the Docklands, the section of London’s East End adjacent to the financial capital of The City that underwent a dramatic re-development during the late ‘80s and early ‘90s. After some twenty years of stagnation and massive unemployment following the shift of London’s docking facilities downriver in the ‘70s, the Docklands area suddenly saw a massive infusion of capital, as abandoned warehouses were converted into loft spaces for wealthy stockbrokers and massive office complexes such as Canary Wharf rose from the abandoned locks next to the Thames. The primary residents of the area, a majority white working class community with centuries of experience as the labor power behind Britain’s maritime empire as well as a growing minority British Asian community originating in immigration from Bangladesh, saw little of this cashflow directed their way. In fact, many families found that the real estate boom inaugurated by the Docklands development project was forcing them out of an area in which their ancestors had lived for generations. Resentment quickly began to mount and, as so often during the Thatcher era, to take on a racialized form. Attacks on members of the East End’s Asian communities increased by 300% during the early ‘90s.

These alarming trends need to be situated in relation to the patterns of uneven development which characterize the global city. The development project that transformed the Docklands section of London’s East End was characteristic of many of the massive revitalization projects of the ‘80s. Such projects refurbished symbolically charged sites of national heritage while ignoring the forms of uneven development that their deployment of resources helped to foster. The Docklands, like Baltimore's Inner Harbor, New York's South Street Seaport, and other sites in the United States, was part of a new wave of urban reform that wholly discarded attempts to create resources for the impoverished communities which were shunted aside in the
course of their development. Indeed, the precondition for such developments was the displacement of working class cultures and the economic relationships that sustained them.

Such processes of development should draw our attention anew to the relation between nation and state. The much discussed disintegration of the nation under the weight of reawakened local ethnic loyalties and transnational identities is tied, ironically, to processes that are inaugurated and continue to be administered by the local and national state. Indeed, reassertions of seemingly atavistic communal sentiments such as those that vex our nightly newscasts gain their prominence precisely as a result of the dissolution of the nationally-framed consensus politics which characterized the post-war Fordist regime of accumulation. As many commentators have noted, the period since the early ‘70s has seen a profound transformation in forms of production and consumption within the industrialized North.\textsuperscript{14} The resulting decline of the institutional framework sustained by mass consumption and production has precipitated a fundamental shift in class alignments. This shift creates the conditions for the gradual dismantling of many organs of the Keynesian welfare state.\textsuperscript{15} While the corrosive social effects of this realignment were particularly evident during the neoconservative retrenchment of the ‘80s and early ‘90s, the dynamics underlying this transformation first became evident during the series of fiscal crises which afflicted cities during the mid- to late-'70s.

The classic analysis of this fiscal crisis by James O'Connor anatomizes the structural contradictions that led to the desocialisation of U.S. cities following the ghetto rebellions of the late '60s in terms that still have relevance today. According to O'Connor, fiscal crises are a result of the incommensurability of the three orders of public socialization of capital. These three orders consist of: 1) social investment capital - the public funding of projects whose profits are privatized; 2) social consumption capital - the subsidizing of the various means of reproduction
for workers; 3) social expenses capital - the means through which the liberal state keeps the peace and legitimates itself. In O'Connor's analysis, the ever-increasing expenses generated by the expanding institutions of socialized capital lead the state's expenditures to outpace its revenues, producing a fiscal crisis. This dynamic is, of course, related to political trends specific to the metropolitan sprawl of the United States - "white flight" from central cities, anti-urban federalism, and the tax revolt of the late '70s, for instance. Nevertheless, the general characteristics of the incommensurability discussed by O'Connor are evident in many cities of the industrialized and developing world. Such fiscal crises, in other words, bring out a more general contradiction of urban capitalism, one which arises from the fact that private property both impedes attempts to socialize control of land and is dependent on that socialization for its own profits. State attempts to resolve this "property contradiction of capitalist urbanization" within a post-Fordist economic climate tend to exacerbate the contradiction further, leading to a fundamental clash between the economic and political structures of a democratic-capitalist society. Indeed, as the state rolls back its provisions for social welfare, its role as a subsidizer of private capital becomes ever more obvious.

In addition, as Anthony King has remarked, this private capital is often freed of the fetters of the democratic will as a result of its perceived transnational character. The upshot is a contemporary tendency to bankroll supra-national interests using national resources under the constant threat of a withdrawal of the economic and social resources conferred by transnational capital. Social friction is also ratcheted up by the allotment of labor rewards for the internationalized private sector which siphon off skilled workers from the national public sector. In addition, public sector spending on the infrastructural requirements of international capital is often mated with the tax concessions needed to lure such capital, contributing to fiscal crisis.
Adding to such tensions, the local state tends to bear the burden of the costs of reproducing a labor force that services transnational capital. Finally, excessive investment in the global city exacerbates forms of regional polarization and uneven development.\textsuperscript{20}

Such an overwhelming catalogue of contradictions does not necessarily mean that the vision of the urban landscape embodied in shocker flicks like \textit{Escape from New York} has in fact become a reality. To the contrary, the booming decade of the '80s witnessed a "revitalization" of many urban cores. Heritage projects such as the Docklands, the most spectacular public face of this transformation, cater to the recentralized professional economic elite who manage the resiliently bullish finance economy of the global city.\textsuperscript{21} During the real estate boom of the '80s, speculation led to surplus construction of buildings designed to store capital rather than people in the midst of a profound housing shortage in the surrounding working class neighborhoods of the East End. The replacement of the former manufacturing base of the Fordist city with elite finance capital and the growth of an increasingly impoverished immigrant population laboring for the professional managerial class in the service sector or in informal and criminalized economies tended to exacerbate the dynamics which foster a dual city. Declining public housing stock festers smack up against sites of overconsumptionist chic in the Docklands area.

The polarization of spatial scales inherent in the dual city leads, inevitably, to an unequal but protracted battle over the role of the state in relation to the shifts in class relations and economic regime characteristic of post-Fordism. This struggle is a political response to the economic crises associated with the cycles of overinvestment and disinvestment in the urban core, one that is not determined in any necessary way by the dynamics of post-Fordism, as some commentators have argued, but rather by a conjunctural class realignment.\textsuperscript{22} One need only examine the differing fortunes of European as against British and American urban areas in order
to gauge the conjunctural rather than necessary nature of these developments. The trend towards
the privatization of the public sphere is, furthermore, taking place within the cities of Britain and
the United States under the aegis of a largely racialized fear of the excluded segments of the
population, who tend to be contained en masse in particular zones of what Mike Davis has
termed the "carceral city". This desocialization of urban space is one in which government
policy plays an important role. In the Docklands in particular, the state has attempted to lure
business investment to a depressed region through massive public subsidy rather than through
policies promoting high quality, high wage work. The service sector economic growth that has
resulted from such measures may have increased the gross national product, but it has been of
relatively little benefit to the manual workers who make up the majority of the East End's
population. In addition, the channeling of public resources - land and money - to subsidize
corporations and real estate speculation inevitably involves the withdrawal of these same
resources from social services, while gentrification simultaneously adds another blow by purging
residential areas of their poor denizens.

The dual city that results from these processes of disinvestment and recentralization
within the metropolis is not, in other words, a natural product, as organic metaphors concerning
the decay of the city would lead one to believe. Yet commentators on urban conditions from
across the political spectrum continue, as Andrew Ross has argued, to describe the complex
changes of contemporary cities in such organic metaphors, using a language shot through with
metaphors of disease and contagion derived from Nineteenth century Social Darwinianism. The
main conceptual tools we have at hand to counter such organic metaphors derive from the theory
and apparatus of modernization and development. Yet, these concepts are predicated on the
notion of a linear progress from undeveloped, subsistence economies to the forms of industrial
economies represented, not surprisingly, by the countries - and, most of all, the metropolitan cities - of the North. As Arif Dirlik has argued, such theories deny the role of spatial relations and the concurrent question of unequal development, presenting themselves instead as an abstract temporal process akin to the seamless progress of the Hegelian dialectic.\(^{26}\) Such a model has, of course, allowed developed countries to cast themselves as the telos towards which all other communities must aspire as well as to represent resistance to development as a form of anachronistic throwback.\(^{27}\)

This ideology of ceaseless progress is now faced with a crisis: the uneven effects of global capitalism have become increasingly evident within Northern metropolises themselves. The developed world has proven unable, in other words, to continue exporting the material and political crises produced by the internal contradictions of industrial development. As a result, the forms of unequal power inherent in such spatial relations are laid bare, made particularly evident, for example, in the patterns of labor migration initiated by the polarized economic forms that dominate the global economy of today.\(^{28}\) The tense, vibrant intermixtures of cultural forms and ethnic groups that result clearly signal the end to the world system established during the post-war period of U.S. hegemony, when "development" was taken to occur within isolated individual nation-states that adopted the appropriate forms of market economies. Questions of transnational or diasporic identities must now be discussed in relation to the inequalities that are interwoven with contemporary globalized spatial and temporal relations.

This is important to emphasize given the pessimistic tenor of some of the recent analyses of the post-Fordist urban realm. For example, picking up on Henri Lefebvre's work, David Harvey has elaborated the notion of the production of space in order to describe the material spatial practices through which postmodern social conditions are constituted. Harvey's
description of the transformation of place into space by transnational capitalism creates the unfortunate impression that social movements are locked into a fetishization of local, essentialist senses of place that leaves them completely vulnerable to the processes of fragmentation upon which flexible forms of accumulation feed. The massively uneven development implicit in post-Fordist flexible accumulation has undeniably produced some devastating effects, among them the combined and uneven development of inner-city zones described above. Nonetheless, social movements have found ways to adapt to recent forms of urban change in order to foster links between local and transnational movements. Indeed, diasporic social movements are actively engaged in new forms of spatial production that redefine place as multivalent and non-essential.

Much recent analysis has, however, tended to portray urban polarization as the inevitable product of the shift from one paradigm to another. The inexorable cultural logic of late capitalism is seen to produce a centerless spatial grid in which the individual subject loses all sense of orientation and broader meaning, producing a schizophrenic flatness of identity and affect. The urge to diagnose the "postmodern condition" has, in other words, led to a reproduction of the deterministic underpinnings of the organic rhetoric of much modernist urban theory. As Cross and Keith have emphasized, the elitist search for an urban "postmodern condition" has in fact contributed to the erasure of diasporic groups within the global city, exacerbating tendencies encouraged by specific government policies and effected by the heritage industry. The protracted battles over the Docklands development scheme demonstrate that the tendency towards the reduction of place into meaningless space discussed by some postmodern theorists has been contested in multiple ways, and has, indeed, led to the reassertion of various forms of place-centered identity. In the face of the sublime angst generated by apocalyptic
assessments of the contemporary urban condition, it is necessary to retain a sense of the continuing vibrancy of local cultures. It is here that we find resistance to the inequalities often generated by the globalization of the economy. Indeed, the agonistic process through which the city is represented should more than reaffirm our sense of the multiple forces at work in the production of space and, indeed, of the multiple meanings that traverse any particular place.

Repetitive Beats and Anti-Racist Rap

In mid-September, 1993, Derek Beackon, a member of the explicitly racist British National Party (BNP), was elected to a council seat in Tower Hamlets, a borough in the Docklands area. Autonomous anti-racist groups such as the Newham Monitoring Committee - long active in the area - moved quickly to challenge the assertion of racialized citizenship rights represented by Beackon’s election in the Docklands. Notwithstanding the significant rise in racist attacks and social polarization that followed Beackon’s victory, he was not returned to a second term of office. However, this relatively isolated expression of overt racism made the enduring racial faultlines in British society brutally evident.

Despite the substantial heterogeneity of Britain’s South Asian population as a result of regional, caste, religious, linguistic, and class differences in their countries of origin and in the UK, young Asians remain subject to the same structural racism as did their parents’ generation. Overwhelmingly concentrated in industries and skill levels which have been on the decline and living in urban areas hardest hit by the restructuring of the global economy, Asians have been the first to suffer from Britain’s economic woes and have yet to reap the rewards of the nation’s halting economic revitalization during the ‘90s. In urban areas such as Birmingham, unemployment among British Asian teenagers is twice as high as that of white school leavers.
Sixty per cent of young black Londoners (statistics which include South Asians) are currently out of work as compared with 11 percent of their white contemporaries. Asian youths’ access to the means of self-expression, whether through education, commodity culture, or control of public space, is being profoundly curtailed by these changes in the post-industrial city. These general statistics hit home particularly hard in the Bangladeshi community of the Docklands area, where unemployment and poverty remain particularly high. Popular stereotypes in Britain concerning the Asian population’s wealth rub salt into the wounds inflicted by these conditions.

The policing of urban space provides a dramatic instance of the diminishing rights of Asian youths in contemporary Britain. At the end of 1994, the Tory government passed the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJA). The capstone in the edifice of “popular authoritarianism” that had been rising throughout the long Tory spell of power, the CJA was designed to ban squatting, to outlaw the activities of hunt saboteurs, to reduce the rights of travellers, and to ban raves - particularly those events in which groups of ten or more youths gathered to listen to music consisting of “sounds wholly or predominantly characterized by the emission of a succession of repetitive beats.”

The ramifications of the CJA for civil liberties in the UK are staggering, particularly since the Act can be extended to control not just the subcultural activities mentioned above but also any and all forms of large scale demonstrations - trade union and anti-racist “assemblies” included. Despite much protest on the part of the subcultures affected - with mass anti-CJA raves and the squatting of Parliament’s roof - intellectuals in Britain have been dismayingly silent concerning the Act’s wholesale criminalization of youth culture and expansion of the police state. Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of this quiescence in the face of popular authoritarianism is, as John Hutnyk has remarked, the lack of widespread protest concerning the provisions the Act contains for the
increase of police power over urban areas. The Act may be seen as the culmination in a long history that includes the “sus” laws and “counter-insurgency” models of policing applied to inner city areas as early as the mid-’70s, all of which contribute to the impression among black residents of these urban zones that they are living in subjugated internal colonies.

In the context of the BNP’s electoral success and the concomitant increase of racialized violence in London’s East End, the rise of militant hip hop groups such as Asian Dub Foundation should hardly be a surprise. What is surprising is that many such groups come from the Asian rather than the West Indian community, unsettling essentializing equations of African ancestry and hip hop style. Predominantly Asian bands such as Asian Dub Foundation, Hustlers HC, Kaliphz, and FUN^DA^MENTAL are taking up the formal qualities of flow and rupture that animate U.S. hip hop culture and using them to articulate an unflinching anti-racist politics. Rather than drawing on the Afrocentric imagination of much U.S. hip hop, these British Asian groups find one of their primary sources of inspiration in the legacy of Indian anti-colonial struggle. In their song “Assassin,” for instance, ADF revive the memory of Udam Singh (aka Mohammed Singh Azad), avenger of the 1919 Amritsar massacre:

MOHAMMED SINGH AZAD /SINDABAD! / NO APOLOGIES / NOT A SHOT IN THE DARK / THIS IS A WARNING / THE SLEEPING TIGER AWAKES EACH MORNING / THE TIME IS NOW RIGHT TO BURST THE IMPERIAL BUBBLE / AND MY ACT OF REVENGE IS JUST A PART OF THE STRUGGLE / A BULLET TO HIS HEAD WON’T BRING BACK THE DEAD / BUT IT WILL LIFT THE SPIRITS OF MY PEOPLE / WE’LL KEEP ON FIGHTING / WE’VE BEEN A NATION ABUSED / YOUR STIFF UPPER LIP WILL BLEED / AND YOUR PRIDE WILL BE BRUISED / NO APOLOGIES / NOT A SHOT IN THE DARK...

By imaginatively inhabiting the identity of Colonel O’Dwyer’s assassin, ADF affiliate themselves with a long tradition of links forged between anti-colonial nationalism in the Third World and anti-racist struggle in the metropolis. Such connections, despite substantial
theoretical and practical obstacles, hold the promise of a political engagement with state power which has typically been ignored in discussions of diasporic identities. Much of this analysis of diasporic identity has focused on the syncretic identities of diasporic subjects in order to challenge dominant notions of national identity. While ADF certainly pick up on this transnational form of critique, their work is animated principally by what they suggest are enduring forms of state violence rather than by an attack on British national identity per se. As a result, the group’s music directs our attention to the specific mechanisms of state power through which oppression is carried out. This is a particularly important move given the current contradictions within Britain, where a new multicultural ideology has gained dominance after Labour’s victory while leaving many of the structures of institutional racism intact. ADF’s focus on state racism thus offers an important incentive to critics to revive a political economy of racism that has dropped out of most analysis of diaspora.

But perhaps the group goes too far in embracing a militant black nationalism that British intellectuals such as Paul Gilroy have been careful to distance themselves from. For Gilroy, the forms of ethnic absolutism that anchor nationalist discourse on both the Left and the Right are equally troubling. In Gilroy’s most recent work, diasporic links become the antidote to what he represents as monolithically constructed forms of nationalism both within the dominant white population and within ethnic minority communities such as African-Americans and black Britons. As Laura Chrisman argues, this repudiation of all forms of nationalism is motivated by a kind of fatalism that ironically marginalizes any evidence of challenges to hegemonic constructions of exclusionary national identity. Gilroy may even expose himself through his advocacy of diaspora to recent criticisms of postcolonial intellectuals, whose frequent advocacy of migrancy has led to accusations concerning their elite status. As part of the burgeoning
transnational information elite, postcolonial critics are of course quite at ease floating free of a particular national framework.\textsuperscript{41}

The significant issue in this context, however, concerns the ramifications of Gilroy’s condemnation of nationalist discourse. This stance all too often blinds us to the counter-hegemonic role played by the discourse of national identity within specific subaltern struggles. What critics such as Gilroy ignore as a result of their embrace of diasporic hybridity is the instrumental role played by the nation-state in contemporary culture. As I demonstrate above, the nation-state remains the crucial conduit through which new forms of transnational capital and culture are elaborated. The result of this failure to tackle the issue of contemporary state formation is a concomitant failure to recognize and unpack the continuing force of counter-hegemonic articulations of national identity within diasporic cultural practice. This is particularly true in relation to the strident black nationalist discourses that circulate within popular culture. It may be more useful to interrogate black nationalist discourse as a symptom of white racist hegemony rather than as a form of self-inflicted false consciousness.\textsuperscript{42} Given the shocking increase in the incidence of racially motivated attacks in London’s East End over the last 10 years, the militant rhetoric of groups such as ADF clearly serves an important role in articulating collective solidarity and utopian alternatives in the face of racial oppression.

ADF is a particularly useful example of the recirculation of black nationalism in hip hop culture. Formed in 1993 during a music technology workshop run by an autonomous anti-racist coalition based in London’s East End, the group maintains active ties to organizations such as Youth Connection that are involved in community organizing and education in the Docklands area. This background in Britain’s deeply-rooted tradition of autonomous anti-racist organizing figures prominently in the group’s work, which often challenges the inequities perpetrated by the
justice system. In this instance, the group reactivates collective memory not simply of anti-colonial resistance but of black British resistance to racist attacks. In “Free Satpal Ram,” for example, ADF catalogue the many instances in which blacks have been prosecuted for legitimate self-defense against racist abuse:

FREE SATPAL RAM / ANOTHER INNOCENT MAN / BIRMINGHAM SIX /
BRIDGEWATER FOUR / CROWN PROSECUTION TOTING UP THE SCORE /
KINGS CROSS TWO / GUILFORD FOUR / WINSTON SILLCOTT - MAN HOW
MANY MORE? / SATPAL ATTACKED IN A RESTAURANT BY RACISTS / NOW
THE BROTHER’S LOCKED UP ON A LIFE TIME BASIS / CONVICTED OF A
MURDER BUT WHAT’S NEVER MENTIONED / SELF DEFENSE WAS HIS ONLY
INTENTION...43

Drawing on the history of anti-racist organizing which arose in London’s black communities in response to racist attacks and police harassment as long ago as the late ‘70s, ADF enact such groups’ “self-defense vibe” in their music. The song’s catalogue of unjustly incarcerated comrades underlines the institutionalized racism of the criminal justice system in Britain. It also, however, suggests that efforts at self-defense within the black community have produced a far reaching strategy of mobilization around particular court cases that ADF are helping to further with their music. In addition, the group’s militant delivery directly challenges the stereotype so prevalent in the contemporary media of Asians as the helpless victims of racial violence.

This challenge to specifically British ideologies of racial subordination extends in the group’s work to issues that underline the interwoven nature of “race” and class power in Britain. In a song such as “PKNB,” for example, ADF respond directly to problems created in the Docklands by the lack of adequate housing stock. As I have explained, these issues figured prominently in the BNP’s successful election campaign in the area. The band’s use of history and statistics to debunk many of the myths that animate the anti-”immigrant” rhetoric of groups
like the BNP is exemplary of their broader project of challenging racist ideology through “conscious” lyrics:

All this talk about housing
Just a method of arousing
bad feeling
Appealing to people’s prejudice
And then they redirect
their lack of self-respect
Towards a visible target
a visible target

You seem to have forgotten
that the apple has always been rotten
And that black people are not
the cause of your problems
Black people are not
the cause of your problems

We’re often told that this
country’s bursting at the seams.
We’re never told that there
are in fact more people leaving
than entering.

Immigration has become
synonymous with black people
Yet over sixty percent of
immigrants are white...

“Things were good in the
good olden days” they say
“Jobs in the factories”
(economic slaves!)
“We kept our doors open
right throughout the day”
(But the poverty was such
that there was nothing to
nick anyway!)
Black people constitute
less than six per cent
of the population

Common sense -
These lyrics are worth quoting at length because of their arresting retort to the BNP’s nostalgic rhetoric concerning the loss of (white) community identity. During their election campaign, the BNP played on fears among the Dockland’s white residents by suggesting that the stability and wholeness of their community had been destroyed by the arrival of blacks from the New Commonwealth (the former colonies). In “PKNB,” ADF implies that the anti-immigrant hysteria which both established and neo-fascist politicians whipped up during the ‘80s and ‘90s has helped to generate a spurious sense of “white” identity. As Phil Cohen has shown, the Cockney ethnicity that many white residents of the Docklands lay claim to has been subject to precisely the forms of racialization and subordination that British Asians in the area are now experiencing. Of course, such forms of racialization pit members of the working class against one another rather than unifying them against economic exploitation. In order to debunk the BNP’s nostalgic rhetoric concerning white community, ADF employ a notion of the ideological construction of “common sense” that recalls Stuart Hall’s work on Gramscian articulations of hegemony in popular culture. Using a few telling statistics that underline the groundlessness of moral panics concerning the “swamping” of Britain by immigrants, the group resituates racist rhetoric as part of a broader ideology that maintains the power of the ruling classes. Perhaps more interestingly in the context of the debates about re-development in the Docklands, ADF’s lyrics also underline the extent to which nostalgic evocations of community identity gloss over
the forms of class-based exploitation on which such collective experience is predicated. The group’s attack on racism, in other words, extends beyond militant self-defense to a reconfiguration of notions of community. By underlining the history of class oppression in the area, ADF locate issues upon which blacks and whites can find common ground.

As we have seen, ADF’s “conscious” lyrics engage with the legacy of anti-racist, anti-colonial projects of transnational affiliation. In doing so, the group taps into a history of resistance that offers powerful images of subaltern revolt and identity for members of the British Asian diaspora. Yet ADF’s work is also grounded very much in responses to local struggles over space, place and identity that develop in the context of globalization. Such issues, I have argued, need to be considered in relation to a political economy of racism and of contemporary state power. The legacy of resistance to the state, for instance, informs the work of groups such as ADF when they challenge, as they have done, the racism of Britain’s immigration legislation, call for the repeal of the Criminal Justice Act, and indict the racialized capitalism which continues to adversely impact working class black communities under the new Labour dispensation. The group’s insistence on the impact of state power within such local struggles should redirect our attention to the contradictory role played by the nation-state today. Such initiatives are particularly important since, as Saskia Sassen has recently suggested, the spiralling contradictions inherent in the nation-state's attempt to lubricate the flow of capital while simultaneously seeking to clamp down on the racialized populations who service the dual city’s economy cannot be evaded.47

Dub Mentality
I don’t want, however, to suggest that we endorse ADF’s counter-hegemonic nationalist rhetoric uncritically or discuss it as an undifferentiated phenomenon. Like other varieties, this form of nationalism certainly has its own limits and contradictions. For example, the mode of confrontational, direct action politics that articulations of black nationalism such as ADF’s often adopt tends to marginalize women. In what remains one of the most suggestive critiques of recent South Asian musical production in Britain, Gayatri Gopinath argues that the concept of diaspora has tenacious forms of male- and heterosexual-orientation embedded within it, despite its useful role in deconstructing dominant notions of national identity. There is much in this argument that rings true. Indeed, issues of gender equality seldom figure in ADF’s own work. In one of the sole instances in which the group addresses women, a fairly traditional notion of gender roles is used to animate exhortations against “slack” dancehall boasting concerning male sexual prowess:

Tu meri me tera
You are mine and I am yours
Standing together
Side by side
I’m not your shadow
But I could be your guide
Stick with me in this time of insanity
Working together to survive this reality
Without you I don’t think I could bear
Belief in myself man
You take me there
You seem me as I am
And what I wanna be
The hopes for myself
Yet you are the key
And when I’m on the mic
I don’t have to chat shit
Guns
or the size of my prick
Your inspiration makes me rap wisely
Like Tunes for a cold
You make me think clearly
Asian sisters shouldn’t hear slackness
But conscious lyrics
like Sounds of Blackness
Asian Brothers
Come listen to me
Respect your sisters
If you wanna be free

As these lyrics suggest, ADF mirror some of the central contradictions that characterize other forms of hip hop culture, despite their repudiation of “slackness.” In this song, significantly entitled “Tu Meri” (you are mine), the all-male group acknowledges the important role of women in reproducing collective identity. Yet the song replicates some highly problematic paradigms of gender identity. Despite the group’s injunction to Asian men to respect their sisters, its notion of woman as spiritual guide reiterates the logic of objectification present in the Bollywood film industry from which the group samples a backing female vocal track for the song. As Sumita Chakravarty has argued in her book on Hindi film: “In a patriarchal culture, man’s anxieties about and expectations of the harnessing of female sexuality for nurturance and guardianship of communal norms and values have become embodied in idealizations of woman.” Women are seen as repositories of the community’s ideals, kept unsullied presumably through their separation from public space.

The forms of subordination that attend such iconic representations of feminine identity are, I would suggest, intimately connected to the history of spatial dislocation and contestation that has characterized South Asian experience in urban Britain. The self-defense groups alongside which some of the new Asian rap groups have evolved forged a powerful anti-racist politics during the ‘80s. Nonetheless, this oppositional politics often involved the projection of men as defenders of the community. Women were represented, in turn, as embodiments of community identity and honor. British Asian masculinities are certainly neither static nor
essentialized: to suggest this would be to indulge in precisely the form of orientalist discourse that has circulated in Britain to such destructive effect following the Rushdie Affair. It is important to note, however, that the politics of spectacular self-assertion and collective mobilization that accompanied struggles for the control of social space during this period consolidated Asian masculinities in ways that can potentially work against challenges to the subordination of Asian women.

As Stuart Hall has argued, the ‘90s have, nonetheless, seen the demise of “the innocent black subject.” In part, this shift has been seen by Hall and others as fragmenting the coalitional politics that unified South Asian, Afro-Caribbean, and other racialized groups in Britain. According to this analysis, ethnicities and religious identities within diasporic groups have become ever more prominent, bringing the unitary model of black identity that helped mobilize so many anti-racist struggles throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s into question. Yet the demise of this innocent black subject has also been brought about by artists and activists who have highlighted issues relating to the differences of gender and sexual orientation that bisect ethnic minority communities. For instance, in the work of filmmakers like Gurinder Chadha and Isaac Julien, as well as in the projects advanced by activist groups such as Women Against Fundamentalism, the exclusionary discourses that surround differences of identity and sexuality are systematically deconstructed and rearticulated.

Despite its unsettling parallels with patriarchal nationalism, ADF’s “Tu Meri” is clearly a response to such challenges to gender relations within the British South Asian community. In the first stanza of the song, MC Master D actually takes on a woman’s voice in order to reject the fundamentalist Islamic notion of woman as man’s shadow. This act of ventriloquism certainly runs up against the limits of the traditional construction of femininity I discussed above. Yet it
also suggests that gender roles are by no means monolithic in this politicized segment of hip hop culture. As Tricia Rose has emphasized in her discussion of hip hop in the U.S., the attitudes towards gender and sexuality that one finds in popular culture not only reflect the contradictions that arise from processes of racialized subordination and exploitation, but also suggest the ongoing interrogation of oppressive stereotypes within subaltern communities.\textsuperscript{52} Such relatively open-ended contestation of identity promises to generate novel strategies for negotiating the social relations and technologies that emplot diasporic communities in Britain.

Perhaps the most obvious instance of such novel strategies in ADF’s music involves the creation of alliances that cross ethnic boundaries. Syncretic musical forms such as ADF’s mixture of Caribbean dub and a variety of South Asian sounds reflect the evolution of a hybrid youth culture in musical form. On their song “Dub Mentality,” for instance, the group employ the metaphor of “dub space” to issue an appeal for unity among black Britons:

DUB IS THE PLACE WE COME TO ARGUE AND DEBATE / IT ISN’T JUST A BACKDROP FOR OUR HERBAL INTAKE / AND IN THIS TIME WE FILL THE SPACE WITH NOISE / BLACK NOISE WILL BE SOUND YOU CAN’T AVOID / WE’RE RAISING OUR VOICES TO REFLECT OUR REALITY / USING DUB AS OUR FOUNDATION BECAUSE WE’VE GOT DUB MENTALITY / LISTEN TO THE SOUND OF THE DRUM AND BASS / DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES MEET UP IN THE SAME PLACE / WE ARE MIXING THE FLAVOURS TO SUIT EVERY TASTE / THIS MUSIC HAVE THE POWER FOR ALL OF THE HUMAN RACE / DUB IS THE TEACHER / JUNGLE IS THE PREACHER / DUB EDUCATION THROUGH THE JUNGLE A GO REACH YA\textsuperscript{53}

Dub music, which began as an experimental form that occupied the b-sides of hit songs, has always functioned as a critical dismantling of the dominant forms of reggae music. By cutting and mixing the lyrics and musical form of the hits of the day, dub musicians enact a transformational practice that, Paul Gilroy has argued, forces listeners to adopt a critical position in relation to the messages disseminated through the media.\textsuperscript{54} The avant-gardist tones of this
formal reading of dub might seem questionable were it not evident from ADF’s lyrics that the group is clearly situating themselves in a critical relation to current dominant musical trends. Dub becomes a form of community education that counters the egotistical self-assertions associated with “slackness” in dancehall culture.

In addition to this emphasis on dub as education, ADF frame dub as a syncretic musical form where previously disparate musical traditions from Britain’s predominant diasporic groups cross-pollinate. The West Indian aesthetic of dub is taken up by ADF to license the cut’n’paste technique that digital technology such as MIDI allows contemporary producers to employ with seamless mastery. In “Dub Mentality,” the unity effected is between dub and “jungle,” the hyperkinetic dance form that evolved in the black British club cultures of the mid-'90s. Jungle’s computer-engineered tempos, which average over 120 beats per minute, are tempered by a halftime bass line similar to that found in reggae. The hectic sampling mode of this multiform genre, which tosses together multiple musical traditions - jazz, blues, shantytown reggae, hip hop, and Detroit techno - effects a trans-generational synthesis that has been described as Britain’s first entirely home-grown musical style. ADF, along with other Asian DJs such as Bally Sagoo, increase the multiple layering of styles that characterizes Jungle by mixing in some of the myriad musical forms that can be found in South Asian popular culture. It should be underlined, however, that the resulting syncretism is not, as is true of much “world music,” simply a new form of neo-orientalism, an exoticising aural tourism. Instead, ADF’s polymorphous musicality originates in the hybrid listening and performing communities in which they participate.55

Underlying the forms of musical syncretism one hears on ADF’s albums, in other words, dub acts as a musical space where different communities are brought into harmonious contact. Les Back’s recent ethnographic work on the musical subcultures of black Britain suggests that
the hybrid music created by ADF finds a corollary in the bonds formed in the multi-racial performance sites he terms “intermezzo culture.” These sites form relatively organic spaces where contemporary youth cultures are recreating the traditions of unity forged in community struggles against racism during the late ‘70s and ‘80s. The connection between these multi-racial sites of musical consumption/performance and traditions of overt political unity is rendered explicit on songs such as “Culture Move.” Here, ADF team up with the seminal Afro-Caribbean MC Navigator to attack politicians who are “segregating the massive, separating the nation.” Along with other militant Asian hip hop outfits like FUN^DA^MENTAL (which is made up of both Asian and Afro-Caribbean members), ADF revive the anti-essentialist politics of blackness that characterized Britain in the late ’70s and ‘80s. In this tradition, blackness is not an immutable somatic characteristic, but rather derives from the processes of racialization and forms of community solidarity forged in post-war Britain. In reviving this tradition, ADF also reanimates the project of uniting Britain’s racialized groups behind a positive, oppositional identity. As John Hutnyk has convincingly argued, the sense of the fragmentation of this project into ethnic splinters that has figured in recent assessments by prominent black British intellectuals may be mistaken given these trends within youth culture. In ADF’s work at least, a definition of blackness that is open-ended and formulated to extend forms of affiliation between the oppressed retains its bite.

Conclusion

ADF’s “dub mentality” is a potent term that alludes both to the formal as well as the social bonds effected within contemporary black British musical subcultures. These subcultures face increasing odds in a global economy. Despite the facility with contemporary sampling
technologies that allows them to create the musical mixtures discussed above, ADF characterize themselves as part of the “digital underclass.” More globally connected them ever before, black youths in contemporary Britain are ironically also seeing their chances for social mobility worsening. With these declining prospects come increasing incidences of racial attacks and violent policing. ADF’s militant stance and politics of unity represent a subcultural response to the polarizing dynamics and racial hostilities that traverse the dual city.

The role of the state in fostering the incendiary conditions created within communities such as London’s Docklands has figured too seldom in contemporary analyses of globalization. Apparently swept up by the hegemony of the neo-liberal epoch that began in the late ‘70s, few critics of the global cultural economy have explored the warnings issued by theorists of the state at the beginning of this period. Stuart Hall and his colleagues at Birmingham, for example, provided a particularly suggestive reading of the rise of state authoritarianism in their work of the late ‘70s, *Policing the Crisis*. For Hall and his collaborators, the “organic” crisis that cut across economic, political and social formations in Britain following the end of the economic boom in the mid ‘70s lead inexorably towards an increasing assertion of the state’s policing function. It is my contention that this new state formation and the post-Fordist economic and social forms that figure so prominently in analyses of globalization are inescapably connected. The move from Fordism to post-Fordism leads directly to a shift to what Hall and Poulantzas called the “exceptional state.” As the nation-state’s redistributive role wanes in the harsh calculus of global neo-liberal orthodoxy, so the balance between consent and coercion remarked on by Gramsci as a vital constituent of hegemony in industrially developed nations tips towards the latter. Increasingly draconian forms of popular authoritarianism target the racialized segments of
societies where the elite are backing away from their commitment to remedy the contradictions of capital’s boom and bust cycles.

We need to reintroduce the insights of Hall and his collaborators concerning the fundamental relationship between this shift in the internal balance of hegemony and the increasing polarization of class forces into our considerations of the global cultural economy.

For, while diasporic groups such as black Britons are exemplary of the new transnational economy of information and affiliation, they are also particularly subject to the polarizing forces unleashed in the dual city. Indeed, recent discussions of global cities have stressed precisely the patterns of dichotomized occupational structures and spatial apartheid that Hall’s work in the late ‘70s augured. A recuperation of this focus on the shifting balance of hegemony within evolving state formations would generate a better understanding of the cultural forms being produced within global cities such as London. We cannot grasp the appeal and spread of hip hop culture across national boundaries, in other words, without also understanding the conditions of uneven development that characterize global cities such as London. Renewed attention to such material conditions might also lead to a revived sense of agency in addressing the inequities fostered by globalization. As ADF puts it, “this is a warning to the slack society / release the pressure.”
Endnotes

I am indebted to Rob Latham, Jael Silliman, and Ashish Rajadhyaksha for their comments on this paper. In addition, I appreciate the help of members of the University of Iowa’s Sound Research Seminar and the South Asian Studies Program, where I presented portions of this essay.


7. A particularly useful model for such a project of interconnection can be found in Neil Smith’s “Homeless/global: Scaling Places,” in Jon Bird et al. (eds.), Mapping the Futures (New York: Routledge, 1993).

9. A useful analogy here might be the sign in Volosinov’s discussion of the social production of meaning, which functions as a contested site where dominant groups attempt to assert hegemony in order to secure consent. See Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (New York; Seminar Press, 1973).


14. Probably the best recent overview of these trends is provided by David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity. I draw here, however, on Saskia Sassen’s analysis of the impact of these shifts in regime of accumulation and the corresponding modes of social and political

15 One of the best in-depth studies of these dynamics within a particular national frame can be found in Mike Davis's Prisoners of the American Dream (New York: Verso, 1985).


20 King, Global Cities, p. 148.


22 For an attack on the economic determinism of much of the "new times" argument, see Frances Fox Piven, "Is it Global Economics or Neo-Laissez-Faire?," New Left Review (Winter 1996).


25 Ross, p. 120.

27. As the work of Johannes Fabian has made clear, this "denial of coevalness" is an inveterate strategy of western colonizers. See his *Time and the Other* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).


29. David Harvey, "From Space to Place and Back Again," in Jon Bird et al. (eds.), *Mapping the Futures* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

30. The most prominent proponents of such theorization of urban transformations have been David Harvey and Fredric Jameson. For a critique of sublime angst involved in many such analyses of the vacuity of the "non-place urban realm", see Elizabeth Wilson, "The Rhetoric of Urban Space," *New Left Review*, (Fall 1995).


33. Hutnyk, p. 159.


36. The Black Panther’s use of Frantz Fanon’s anti-colonial theory would be another important example of such linkages.

37. The handling of the Stephen Lawrence murder by British courts and police authorities is a perfect example of the contradictions that remain alive in what is supposedly a new Britain.

38. Gilroy makes this point repeatedly, although he first sounds such warnings against black nationalism in There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 65ff.

39. See, for example, Gilroy’s, “It’s a family affair: black culture and the trope of kinship,” Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black Cultures (London: Serpent’s Tail, 1993).


42. Chrisman, p. 56.


51. As Timothy Taylor has argued concerning Apache Indian’s purported sexism, younger members of the British Asian community are far too aware of feminist arguments to engage in bald assertions of male supremacy. See Taylor’s *Global Pop: World Music, World Markets* (New York: Routledge, 1997).


55. As the group writes in a liner note on their album *Facts and Fictions*: “The music we make supposedly contains a lot of different styles - but it’s not eclectic. It’s a reflection of everything that we listen to and the people we interact with.”


